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A B S T R A C T
Justice for nature remains a confused term. In recent decades justice has predominantly been limited to
humanity, with a strong focus on social justice, and its spin-off – environmental justice for people. We first
examine the formal rationale for ecocentrism and ecological ethics, as this underpins attitudes towards justice for
nature, and show how justice for nature has been affected by concerns about dualisms and by strong anthro-
pocentric bias. We next consider the traditional meaning of social justice, alongside the recent move by some
scholars to push justice for nature into social justice, effectively weakening any move to place ecojustice centre-
stage. This, we argue, is both unethical and doomed to failure as a strategy to protect life on Earth. The dominant
meaning of ‘environmental justice’ – in essence, justice for humans in regard to environmental issues – is also
explored. We next discuss what ecological justice (ecojustice) is, and how academia has ignored it for many
decades. The charge of ecojustice being ‘antihuman’ is refuted. We argue that distributive justice can also apply
to nature, including an ethic of bio-proportionality, and also consider how to reconcile social justice and eco-
justice, arguing that ecojustice must now be foregrounded to ensure effective conservation. After suggesting a
‘Framework for implementing ecojustice’ for conservation practitioners, we conclude by urging academia to
foreground ecojustice.
1. Introduction
Scientists have now credibly established that anthropogenic ex-
tinctions began during the Late Pleistocene as Homo sapiens spread out
of Africa into Eurasia and beyond (Harari, 2015), and there is now a
broad consensus that we have entered the 6th mass extinction event in
the history of Planet Earth (Cafaro and Crist, 2012; Ceballos et al.,
2015). During the past five decades, scholars and policy-makers have
been aware of this, first pending and now unfolding, global-scale crisis.
Despite the development of a large body of social and ecological
literature, we are today further than ever from addressing and stopping
this mass extinction. Worse, there is currently much debate about
whether this mass extinction actually needs to be averted, or can be
accommodated by letting supposedly non-essential species go extinct
(Buckley, 2016; Vucetich et al., 2017). Academics seem to be increas-
ingly pitted against one another on the key issue of whether conserving
nature is worthy for its own sake, or only indirectly - to the extent it
benefits people. In other words, debates continue about whether social
(i.e. inter-human) justice trumps ecological justice (justice for the
nonhuman). For example, the widely-accepted protected-area targets
for biodiversity aim to protect 17% of terrestrial habitats and 10% of
coastal and marine areas (CBD, 1992), but these have already been
criticized as likely to be ‘socially unjust’ (e.g. Bennett et al., 2017). The
recent realization that we may in fact need to more than double the
earlier envisioned protected areas to achieve biodiversity protection
(Dinerstein et al., 2017) has led to increasing tension between the re-
spective advocates of social and ecological justice (Martin et al., 2016).
In this article, we argue that ecological justice must now be fore-
grounded in order to avert a planetary collapse. Ecological justice is
most appropriately based upon ecological ethics derived from an eco-
centric worldview, a position that has been developed over the past
75 years (e.g. Taylor, 2010; Curry, 2011).
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We proceed by first summarizing the formal rationale in support of
ecocentrism, which has received only minimal attention in the con-
servation literature. We then address the topics of social, environ-
mental, ecological, and distributive justice, and how an ecocentric
worldview coheres with ecological justice. We conclude with a dis-
cussion of how to reconcile social and ecojustice and propose an eco-
justice framework for immediate use by conservation practitioners.
2. The formal rationale for ecocentrism and ecological ethics
An ecocentric worldview is one in which human and nonhuman
organisms, species, ecosystems, and ecosystem processes are all un-
derstood to have moral value. Although there is robust discussion over
how to label such moral value, ecocentric value systems are typically
understood to view all natural entities as having ‘intrinsic’ or ‘inherent’
value (Curry, 2011; Rolston III, 2012; Callicott, 2013, 2017; Batavia
and Nelson, 2017; Washington et al., 2017). By finding intrinsic value
in nonhuman individuals and collectives, the concept of ecocentrism at
first appears at odds with post-enlightenment Western ethics. Upon
deeper consideration however, ecocentrism is supported by our current
multi-level understanding of physical and biological sciences (Traulsen
and Nowak, 2006; Callicott, 2013; Farine et al., 2015) and expands
rather than opposes Western ethics (Nash, 1989). To consider in-
dividual humans (or even nonhumans) the sole locus of value goes
against the basis of ecological and evolutionary theory. Clearly, no in-
dividual of any species can exist in isolation from conspecifics or other
species, and we now recognize multi-level selection (genes, individuals,
groups) as a key concept in evolution (Traulsen and Nowak, 2006). The
knowledge gained over the past 150 years regarding the eco-evolu-
tionary dynamics of the biosphere demands a re-assessment of the
philosophical worldview that individual members of a single species,
Homo sapiens, are the sole agents of moral worth (Rolston III, 1985;
Washington et al., 2017).
It should be noted from the outset that our discussion comes from an
ecocentric worldview that has been influenced by notions of biotic
‘kinship’ that have long been felt in many indigenous cultures
(Knudtson and Suzuki, 1992; Deloria, 1994; Weaver, 1996; Berkes,
1999; Curry, 2011; Kimmerer, 2013). Many such cultures saw nature as
kin and viewed themselves as part of nature (and many continue this
belief). Both ecocentrism and indigenous kinship ethics see life as kin
and worthy of respect and a duty of care (Neidjie et al., 1985), as they
accept their intrinsic value. Anthropocentrism does not do this, seeing
all of nature as just a resource for human use (Crist, 2012). For many
indigenous cultures, the biotic community as a whole - nature - was
their ‘society’ (Snyder, 1990). As Fisher (2013) notes for Koyukon In-
dians in Alaska, the environment is like a second society in which
people live, governed by elaborate rules of behavior and etiquette, and
the Koyukon saw their surroundings as aware, sensate and personified.
Strang (2019) notes that Australian Aborigines considered the land to
be a sentient landscape, inhabited by the totemic ancestral beings who
created the world and its human and non-human inhabitants during the
‘early days’ of cosmogenesis, commonly called the Dreamtime. The
ancestral beings remain, held in the land and its waters, as a source of
the Ancestral Law that underpins every aspect of Aboriginal life, and as
a continued presence that renders the landscape sentient, alive and
responsive to human action. Strang (2019) concludes that for both
Māori and for Aboriginal Australians, the non-human world and its
material components contain the consciousness and agency of their
ancestral spiritual beings.
Similar ideas have also been expressed and promoted by Western
scientists and thought leaders, including Charles Darwin, who specifi-
cally alluded to the moral implications of a recognition that all living
things share a common ancestor (Worster, 1994), an implication that
Leopold (1949: 262) has also expressed:
A thing is right when it tends to preserve the integrity, stability and
beauty of the biotic community. It is wrong when it tends otherwise.
Many others around the world have embraced ecocentric moral (and
often spiritual) sentiments in their own ways (Taylor, 2010), such as the
founders of the Society for Conservation Biology (SCB) in 1986.
Ehrenfeld (1978) wrote the classic ‘The Arrogance of Humanism’, and
became Conservation Biology's first editor. Michael Soulé, who also
played a leading role in the founding of the Society, invited the deep
ecology philosopher Arne Naess to give the keynote at the Society's
second conference (Taylor, 2005; Piccolo et al., 2018). Indeed, con-
tinued support by leading conservationists for ecocentrism has again
been demonstrated recently (EC, 2017). Given this history, it is sur-
prising (as well as troubling) that there is comparatively little discourse
about ecocentrism in the scientific or philosophical literature. For ex-
ample, the Oxford Handbook of Environmental Ethics (Gardiner and
Thompson, 2016) lists the word ‘ecocentrism’ only 6 times in some 600
pages. The word does not appear at all in the index of the 2017 Rou-
tledge Handbook of Philosophy of Biodiversity (Garson et al., 2017);
neither does ‘intrinsic value’.
If the nations of the world have committed to the goal of protecting
17% of the Earth's terrestrial habitats (and there are serious proposals
to protect 50%, Wilson, 2016), what values are we trying to preserve? Is
the rationale that we need to protect such vast areas solely for human
use and enjoyment (i.e. their utilitarian ecosystem services)? Con-
servation on that basis could thus be justified as a moral duty towards
other humans, either currently living or unborn, under the concept of
inter-generational equity (Treves et al., 2018). Alternatively, are there
values outside of human preference that we have a moral duty to
protect?
Leopold's Land Ethic was founded upon the recognition that Homo
sapiens individuals are: “plain members and citizens of the biotic
community” as understood through the lens of Darwinian evolution.
There has been some discussion in philosophy over recent decades
about anthropocentrism and its contrary, ecocentrism (e.g. Ehrenfeld,
1978; Shepard, 1982; Berry, 1988; Vilkka, 1997; Taylor, 2010; Curry,
2011; Rolston III, 2012; Vetlesen, 2015; Washington et al., 2017;
Kopnina et al., 2018a, 2018b; Piccolo et al., 2018). Anthropocentrism
still remains the dominant worldview in academia, yet an increasing
number of scholars are speaking out against it, in recognition of the
devastating impact it has on the Earth's ecosystems (e.g. Taylor, 2010;
Curry, 2011; Cafaro and Crist, 2012; Fisher, 2013; Vetlesen, 2015).
Philosophers have made strong cases for extension of ethical con-
sideration from sentient beings through all life (e.g. biocentrism,
Taylor, 1986) and more broadly to ecological collectives such as species
(Rolston III, 1985) and ecosystems (Vilkka, 1997; Callicott, 2017). In-
deed we suggest that ethical extensionism is an important part of how
society progresses ethically.
Human individuals are themselves complex ecosystems of myriad
microorganisms, so much so that we contain more bacterial cells than
human cells (Wilson, 2016: 121–30). The upshot of this is that if we fail
to attribute ‘moral worth’ to collectives - we are ourselves of no worth
(Callicott, 2016). If we recognize the moral worth of collectives, we
cannot fail to attribute worth to species and ecosystems. Attributing
value to ecological collectives is called ecocentrism; upholding our
moral duty to consider such value is called ecological justice. However,
even though there has been some academic discussion of ecocentrism,
there has been less of ecological justice (e.g. Bowers, 2001; Baxter,
2005), and such discussion has largely been ignored, and has not been
foregrounded in regard to conservation. We also believe that the
question of ‘justice’ is quite confused in regard to nature, and that many
approaches are strongly influenced by anthropocentric bias. We pro-
pose to clarify this confusion through a discussion of a number of key
terms and issues.
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3. Justice for nature
We are concerned that ‘justice for nature’ has been ignored or de-
nied, being something of a taboo that academia avoids. Further denial
will only exacerbate the ongoing biodiversity crisis. We will discuss the
confusion around justice, and consider the terms social, environmental,
ecological and distributive justice.
3.1. Confusion created by the ‘dualism’ debate
It is worth noting that many in academia (especially post-
modernists) dislike ‘dualisms’ (or dichotomies), to the extent they seek
to deny or deconstruct them. There is no specific problem acknowl-
edging that there are differences in nature, and contrasting two ends of
a spectrum. More problematic is seeing the two poles of a dualism as
totally separate, with nothing in-between. The real problem comes
when we apply dualisms to humanity vs nature (or culture vs nature, or
mind vs body), as if it is one or the other, with no middle ground. The
question of whether humanity is ‘part of nature’ merits consideration.
Any biologist who has studied evolution can explain that humanity
evolved from nature, hence humanity is indeed part of nature in evo-
lutionary terms. However, humans are also a sentient and self-aware
‘nature’ that has created culture and technology, and these allow our
species to do what other species cannot: willfully change the planet.
An argument can be made that it is fully appropriate to speak of
‘human nature’ and ‘nonhuman nature’ – both are nature, but humanity
is a specific (not better) case, as it has ‘culture’. Gare (1995), Rolston III
(2001), and Plumwood (2001) argue similarly on this topic – that hu-
mans and their culture are a part of nature, but we are a ‘distinctive’
part. We can thus recognise ‘difference’ without seeking to create du-
alisms. However, there is also the issue that, by removing the distinc-
tion between culture and nature, we may be ignoring that human in-
terests often do not coincide with those of nonhuman nature. As
Kopnina (2016: 417) argues:
In deconstructing the dichotomy between humans and non-humans,
we might be simultaneously erasing the issue of human chauvinism
and speciesism. For example, if we were to reject the dichotomy
between slaves and slave owners (because they are all humans, after
all), we might also be de-politicising the necessity to critically ad-
dress the institution of slavery itself.
Kopnina (2016) argues that nobody ‘likes’ dichotomies such as that
between anthropocentrism and ecocentrism, or humans and nature.
Yet, she notes (ibid): “practically and ethically speaking, they may be
necessary, particularly where blatant discriminations against non-hu-
mans continue”.
3.2. Is ‘justice for nature’ confused?
The key problem in this discussion remains anthropocentrism,
especially in its ‘human supremacy’ approach (Crist, 2012). By ex-
plicitly privileging human welfare over that of all other living beings,
anthropocentrism denies ecological justice (Eckersley, 1992;
Schlosberg, 2004; Baxter, 2005; Strang, 2016) and the ‘Rights of
Nature’ (Borràs, 2016), the case for legal recognition of which is argued
by Earth jurisprudence (Cullinan, 2003; Burdon, 2011). If nature is
ruled out as deserving any moral consideration, then justice for nature
is similarly abandoned, as nature doesn't count, has no ‘rights’ and is
not deemed to be a locus of intrinsic value.
We note that some scholars from the social justice area tend to have
a focus on (human) society, but also have an aversion to dualisms.
Rather than argue that humanity (and its culture) are part of nature,
they take the surprising approach that nature is part of culture (e.g.
Schama, 1995; Langton, 1998; Morton, 2007). Nature then just be-
comes window-dressing, an add-on to culture. Such an approach re-
moves any agency from nature. Nature may be given some passing
moral consideration, or even be granted some (occasionally mentioned)
‘intrinsic value’. However, such an approach nevertheless subscribes
fully to the ‘Greater Value’ assumption – nature has some intrinsic
value, but wherever humans and nature conflict, humans take precedence
(Curry, 2011). In regard to justice, this process has recently been op-
erating in regard to ‘social justice’.
3.3. Social justice
The dominant meaning of social justice is justice for humans. The
Oxford English Dictionary (OED) defines social justice as: “Justice in
terms of the distribution of wealth, opportunities, and privileges within
a society”. By ‘society’, the OED defines this as: “The aggregate of
people living together in a more or less ordered community”. Other
common definitions confirm that the overwhelmingly dominant
meaning is that a ‘society’ is a group of people, and social justice is
about justice within human society. However, recently some scholars
writing about ‘just conservation’ and social justice have sought to re-
define social justice as the ‘fair treatment of others’, where the others
are left open, and may include nonhuman nature. This was recently
argued by Vucetich et al. (2018). By widening the scope of social justice
to include nonhumans, they seem to operate on the assumption they are
doing something good. Vucetich et al. (2018: 23) define social justice:
“broadly enough to encompass animal welfare” as well as supposedly
being concerned with nonhuman ‘others’. However, in an earlier article
by some of the same authors, Vucetich and Nelson, (2013: 13) reflect
on: “the ethical costs that action might incur on social justice, or animal
welfare” and conflicts: “with social justice, human liberty, and concern
for the welfare of individual animals” (Ibid: 19) – whereby social justice
and animal welfare are seen as separate. In another publication,
Vucetich et al. (2015: 10) reflect that: “the principles of social justice
are a fundamentally important means of weighing and adjudicating
competing claims among humans”. Vucetich et al. (2018: 23) however
propose new principles for just conservation: “If a significant and
genuine conservation interest calls for restricting a human interest, that
restriction should occur except when doing so would result in in-
justice”. The key question however is: injustice for whom? Does it con-
cern only humans, or individuals within species, or entire ecosystems,
or all of these? Since the authors address issues that the critics of
conservation put forth - financial costs and loss of cultural tradition - it
seems that they are only talking about humans. Indeed, in their dis-
cussion of ‘conservation conflict resolution’ Vucetich et al. (2018) they
do not include ecological justice as part of the mix.
Offering expansion of the social justice category to include non-
human nature is similar to arguing that nature is part of culture, rather
than the other way around. Nonhuman nature becomes an adjunct
pushed into social justice around the edges of social justice's primary
meaning: justice between, and for, humans (Kopnina, 2014). To see
nature as being part of culture is both anthropocentric and denies the
evolutionary reality that humans and their culture are part of nature.
While we understand and appreciate that Vucetich et al. (2018) attempt
to take a broadly ecocentric perspective, we believe that ignoring any
concept of ‘ecological justice’ for nonhuman nature, and seeking to
push this into social justice, is a mistake both ethically and strategically
in terms of a holistic conservation strategy for life on Earth. Rather,
society needs to foreground a concept of ecological justice.
3.4. Environmental justice
Social justice has also been applied to issues of environmental dis-
tribution of environmental ‘goods’ such as resources, and ‘bads’ such as
pollution. This has mostly been defined by the confusing term ‘en-
vironmental justice’. Some might think that ‘environmental justice’ is
actually ‘justice for the environment’, i.e. for nature; however, that is
not its common academic meaning. Rather, it is an offshoot of social
justice. The United States Environmental Protection Agency (EPA, n.d.)
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defines environmental justice as follows:
Environmental justice is the fair treatment and meaningful in-
volvement of all people regardless of race, color, national origin, or
income with respect to the development, implementation, and en-
forcement of environmental laws, regulations, and policies. … It will
be achieved when everyone enjoys the same degree of protection
from environmental and health hazards and equal access to the
decision-making process to have a healthy environment in which to
live, learn, and work.
Other definitions include: equitable distribution of environmental
risks and benefits; fair and meaningful participation in environmental
decision-making; recognition of community ways of life, local knowl-
edge, and cultural difference; and the capability of (human) commu-
nities and individuals to function and flourish in society (Schlosberg,
2007). Apart from Schlosberg (2007) (who does argue that environ-
mental justice should include natural systems), most definitions of the
term are all about justice for humans. Hence environmental justice
cannot properly be equated to ecological justice, as it expresses no
concern for the nonhuman, per se, nor does it explicitly address the
importance of protecting species or environmental systems. Essentially,
this type of justice is anthropocentric (Cafaro et al., 2017; Washington
et al., 2017; Kopnina et al., 2018a, 2018b; Piccolo et al., 2018). It is also
self-defeating if long-term human flourishing is what we aim for, as
society depends fully on nature to survive (MEA, 2005; Washington,
2013; Oliver et al., 2015).
3.5. Ecological justice (ecojustice)
Ecological justice (Schlosberg, 2004; Baxter, 2005) is distinct from
and more inclusive than environmental justice, and is concerned with
other species independent of their instrumental value for humans. It is
associated with ‘biospheric altruism’, and extends concern beyond
human beings (Shoreman-Ouimet and Kopnina, 2016). Given that it is
proper to refer to human nature and nonhuman nature, there is simi-
larly no ethical or philosophical problem with talking about ‘ecological
justice’ – justice for nonhumans. This acknowledges what we see as a
great moral crime that society has carried out for the last few centuries
– ignoring that the nonhuman also deserves justice. Naess (1973) refers
to ecological justice as justice between the human and non-human
species. Low and Gleeson (1998) similarly define ecojustice as the re-
lationship between people and the rest of the natural world. However,
we consider its simplest definition is justice for nonhuman nature.
Schlosberg (2001) notes that many authors who write about ‘justice’ fail
to attempt to apply the same expanded framework of justice to nature.
He points out that most theorists of justice, from Rawls (1971) to Barry
(1999), ignore or dismiss the notion that justice can be extended be-
yond the human community. The common argument is that justice and
injustice are only applicable to relations among creatures considered
‘moral equals’. For Barry (1999), the questions regarding human
treatment of nature are ones of right and wrong, but not of justice.
However, Dobson (1998) notes that these sentiments of leaving nature
and animals out of traditional theories of justice seem to come more out
of a desire to exclude nature, and not from sound theoretical reasoning.
These reasons usually centre around a fear of giving nature an equal
moral footing. This demonstrates that for decades, an academia domi-
nated by anthropocentrism has refused to consider that nonhuman
nature also has a right to justice. We believe this denial is a major
obstacle to reaching a viable concept of justice that encompasses both
humans and nature, and hence achieving a holistic conservation
strategy for planet Earth.
Ecocentrism has been labelled ‘anti-human’ (Smith, 2014), or as
contrary to concerns for social justice. It should be clarified however
that proponents of ecocentrism and ecojustice are not anti-human
(Curry, 2011). Claims by Vucetich et al. (2018: 25) are mistaken that
those who argue that ‘conservation should trump social justice’ are
misanthropic. Indeed, given that ecological integrity is an indispensable
prerequisite for human existence, let alone flourishing, true eco-
centrism cannot be misanthropic or anti-human, even if, in some si-
tuations, ecojustice may need to be paramount. In that regard, we
support the words of Rowe (1994):
Ecocentrism is not an argument that all organisms have equivalent
value. It is not an anti-human argument nor a put-down of those
seeking social justice. It does not deny that myriad important
homocentric problems exist. But it stands aside from these smaller,
short-term issues in order to consider Ecological Reality. Reflecting
on the ecological status of all organisms, it comprehends the
Ecosphere as a Being that transcends in importance any one single
species, even the self-named sapient one.
The charge of misanthropy against ecocentrism has accordingly
been soundly disputed (Rolston III, 1996; Curry, 2011; Callicott, 2013).
Ecocentrists overwhelmingly support inter-human social justice; how-
ever they also support inter-species justice, or ecojustice for the non-
human world (Baxter, 2005). In particular, ecocentrists do not consider
that social justice needs to be universally achieved before ecological
justice is given consideration, and deny that social justice ought to be
pursued if it exacerbates ecological injustice. Just as environmental
systems involve many interrelationships, environmental and social
systems are entwined, and so social and ecojustice concerns are (and
must be) as well (Washington, 2015). Ecojustice has been a taboo for
academia for far too long. For an effective long-term conservation
strategy, ‘justice’ must now foreground ecojustice.
3.6. Distributive justice for nature?
Social and environmental justice are commonly based on the idea of
distributive justice (Schlosberg, 2001) looking at how ‘goods’ such as
resources, or ‘bads’ such as pollution are distributed amongst society.
However, the idea of distributive justice can also be applied to nature.
Schlosberg (2001) notes that ecological justice - demands an ‘extension
of recognition’ to nature. It requires that nature be seen as an ‘other’
that merits justice. Baxter (2005: 4) argues that nonhuman species have
a moral right to distributive justice, which entails: “recognizing their
claim to a fair share of the environmental resources which all life-forms
need to survive and to flourish”. For example, how much of the Earth's
biological productivity should be controlled by just one species?
Vitousek et al. (1986) estimated that about 40% of Net Primary Pro-
ductivity (NPP) in terrestrial ecosystems was being co-opted by humans
each year. Rojstaczer et al. (2001) argued this could be as high as 55%,
while Haberl et al. (2007) estimated a figure of 24–29%. Whatever
figure one picks, this is a huge percentage of the planet's productivity.
How much is enough, and how much is too much? If it were to ap-
proach 100% of NPP, then natural ecosystems would collapse every-
where, as would our civilization which fully depends on nature
(Cardinale et al., 2012; Washington, 2013). The fact that at least 60% of
ecosystem services are now being degraded or used unsustainably
(MEA, 2005) shows our current appropriation of NPP is too high, as do
other environmental indicators (Wijkman and Rockstrom, 2012; WWF,
2016; GFN, 2018). Clearly, we are way beyond what could be con-
sidered ‘equitable’ in terms of our fair share, in terms of any conception
of holistic distributive justice. The energy of all ecosystems cannot end
up being just for Homo sapiens.
Of course, the application of distributive justice to conservation
need not just be about the energy in ecosystems. As an alternative basis
for conservation policy, an ethic of ‘bio-proportionality’ has been pro-
posed by Mathews (2016). The goal of such an ethic would be: “not
mere viability but optimization: it would seek not merely viable but
optimal populations of all species” (ibid: 140). As Mathews (ibid) notes:
“This has specific policy implications for human population and
strengthens the case for increasing the extent of protected areas”. In
fact, if we applied bio-proportionality, it would need an absolute
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commitment to visions of expanded reserves such as ‘Nature Needs
Half’ (Wilson, 2016; Dinerstein et al., 2017). It would also require a
rapid halt to human population growth through non-coercive means
(Engelman, 2012), as demographic research has made clear, an end-
lessly growing population is impossible and unsustainable (Cafaro and
Crist, 2012). It would require a viable strategy to reduce this to an
ecologically sustainable level. Bio-proportionality would also require
that society abandon the ideology of ‘endless growth’ (Rees, 2008) and
instead adopt a ‘steady state’ economy (Daly, 2014). This would imply
that society re-engineer itself from the current consumer society to the
conserver society (Assadourian, 2013) and move away from in-
dustrialism (Kidner, 2014). The above strategies deserve strong support
and can be considered feasible - if difficult - parts of a meaningful
sustainability (e.g. Washington, 2015). However, none of these are
likely to happen while anthropocentrism remains the dominant
worldview. Like ecojustice in general, a bio-proportionality ethic re-
mains blocked by anthropocentrism.
4. How can social justice and ecojustice be reconciled?
How then can one reconcile social justice (for our species alone)
with ecojustice for the whole of nature? For several centuries, ‘justice’
in Western society (as practiced by governments) has side-lined non-
human nature. Activist pressure has managed to create some legislation
that provided some protection to nonhuman nature. Overall however,
the nonhuman has had no voice, has been denied intrinsic value, and
has been allocated no rights. As Curry (2011) notes the ‘Sole Value’
assumption has been in force, where humanity has the only value. More
recently, some have argued that nature does have some intrinsic value,
but we have then been confronted with the ‘Greater Value’ assumption,
where in any conflict between humans and nature, humans are always
paramount (Curry, 2011). For example, ‘ecohumanism’ sees value in
nature, but also assumes humans have greater value (Vilkka, 1997).
However, in a world where conflicts between humanity and nature are
bound to increase (MEA, 2005; Kumar, 2010; Crist et al., 2017), the
‘Greater Value’ assumption will continue to mean that nature will al-
ways lose out. Effective conservation of nature thus cannot take place
under the ‘Greater Value’ assumption.
However, we do recognize the difficulties in regard to how to ar-
bitrate hard cases where individual organisms, species, and ecosystems
interests do not align. This complex and ethically-fraught issue (given
ecojustice applies to all of these) is beyond the scope of this paper to
address. We do suggest however that the solution will be different in
different places, and under different circumstances. Adopting a thesis of
‘convergence theory’ (pioneered by Norton, 1986) that the anthropo-
centric logic of environmental protection will suffice, as the majority of
human and nonhuman interests supposedly coincide, will not get us far.
This ‘convergence theory’ assumes that maintaining the environment
for human material benefit is the strongest motivation for nature pro-
tection, postulating that anthropocentric self-interest is the best argu-
ment for maintaining the ecological systems on which we depend, ul-
timately converging on the same practical outcomes as ecocentric
positions (Norton, 1984, 1991). However, many scholars point out that
self-interest in fact has not operated well to protect nature (e.g. Rees,
2008). While informed self-interest may produce environmentally po-
sitive outcomes in situations where both humans and environment are
negatively affected, anthropocentrism does not seek to protect nonhu-
mans that have no utilitarian value, nor guarantee animal rights (Katz,
1996; Shoreman-Ouimet and Kopnina, 2015). Plumwood's (2002) cri-
tique of Norton's thesis is illuminating as she exposes Norton's hidden
anthropocentrism. Plumwood notes (Ibid: 125):
Norton calls for a unified approach, but his attempted reconciliation
between ‘anthropocentric environmentalists’ and those who would
challenge anthropocentrism is not a compromise but depends on
finding ways to subsume or dismiss as unimportant just those
environmental values…that challenge human-centredness.
We accept that social justice is by no means universally supported in
Western society (Wilkinson and Pickett, 2010) and that the neoliberal
focus on competition represents a key problem to advancing social
justice. However, we believe it is an even bigger problem when ‘justice’
speaks only of social justice (and its offshoot environmental justice). If
we continue to ignore ecojustice, we believe society is doomed to
promote ongoing ecocide and the ‘bankrupting of nature’ (Wijkman and
Rockstrom, 2012). A meaningful overall theory of justice must rank
ecojustice as at least equally important as social justice. A meaningful
justice will mean that at certain times and in certain places, ecojustice
must supersede social justice in order to protect the remaining natural
world, on which we all depend, humans and other species alike
(Cardinale et al., 2012; Washington, 2013; Oliver et al., 2015). In fact,
in the long-term, ecojustice superseding social justice may be a service
to future social justice, as it protects the free ecosystem services that are
essential for society (especially the poor).
What are some of the best ways to reconcile social justice and
ecojustice? We need to promote the ‘Rights of Nature, and ‘Wild Law’
and ‘ecocide law’ (Higgins, 2010; Borràs, 2016; Sykes, 2016) where
laws specifically argue that nature has an existential right to exist. Part
of this is Earth jurisprudence, a philosophy of law and human gov-
ernance that is based on the idea that humans are only one part of a
wider community of beings, and that the welfare of each member of
that community is dependent on the welfare of the Earth as a whole
(Cullinan, 2003, 2014). We also need a ‘Planetary Declaration on the
Rights of Nature’ (Higgins, 2010). The development of a viable eco-
centric democracy, or ‘ecodemocracy’, may also prove to be of great
assistance (Eckersley, 2004; Baxter, 2005; Schlosberg, 2007). Eco-
democracy’ has been defined by Gray and Curry (2016: 21) as:
Groups and communities using decision-making systems that respect
the principles of human democracy while explicitly extending va-
luation to include the intrinsic value of non-human nature, with the
ultimate goal of evaluating human wants equally to those of other
species and the living systems that make up the Ecosphere.
The groundwork for such decision-making processes is also de-
scribed by Gray and Curry (2016), and spans deliberative processes,
voting proxies for non-humans, juries of citizens, and statutes. As such,
it draws on both the work on ‘Rights of Nature’ described above, and
the less established principle of ‘Representation for Nature’. This latter
concept involves formally accommodating nonhuman nature as stake-
holders in democratic processes, so that their interests are explicitly
considered outside of the bounds of legal mechanisms (i.e. it comple-
ments Wild Law and ecocide law). An intellectual challenge that has
been raised against this idea is that nonhuman nature cannot sensibly
accept the moral obligations associated with the fairness-based under-
pinning of stakeholder processes (e.g. Phillips and Reichart, 2000).
Gray and Curry (2016) counter this challenge by asserting that enti-
tlement for stakeholder status should come not from the capacity to
understand fairness (something which, in any case, can be easily cov-
ered by having human proxies) but instead from the potential to be
subjected to unfair outcomes, such as going extinct. A more practical
challenge is how humans can adequately represent non-human entities,
such as a tree, a river or soil. Gray and Curry (2016) suggest that the
methods of the ‘Council of All Beings’ workshops – a process designed to
help participants step aside from their human identity and speak on
behalf of another life-form (Macy and Brown, 2014) – could be drawn
on, although some fine-tuning would be needed to adapt the applica-
tion of such an approach to the more traditional political setting.
4.1. A framework for implementing ecojustice by conservation practitioners
We propose a framework for conservation practitioners to fore-
ground ecojustice. Our framework is adapted from well-established
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social justice frameworks that have been proposed for conservation
(Franks et al., 2018). Working for ecojustice in conservation (and po-
licies in general) implies engaging in critical self-reflection about the
human-privileged position regarding ‘justice’, so we can see and chal-
lenge the mechanisms of the oppression faced by nature. Our ecojustice
framework has three dimensions: recognition, procedure, and dis-
tribution, as Franks et al. (2018) have proposed for social justice. ‘Re-
cognition’ in ecojustice means recognizing nature has its own interests.
In particular, this assumes that populations, species and ecosystems
have an interest in existing, persisting, maintaining, and regenerating
their vital cycles, structures, functions and processes in evolution. It
implies that conservation is no longer a process between people and
about nature, but between nature and people, and justice has to be
achieved between both.
‘Procedure’ in ecojustice means including nature in decision-making
and dispute resolution processes. This inclusion is different from having
the State nature protection authorities (or environmental organiza-
tions) involved in deliberating or adjudicating processes. State autho-
rities and NGOs represent other human beings who care about nature,
but do not represent nature itself. Refuting this point would logically
mean accepting that only State authorities and NGOs are entitled to
represent local human communities, without giving local communities
themselves the right to self-representation. In practice, including nature
in processes can be implemented by appointing a ‘Human guardian’
acting in nature's best interests (Stone, 1972). Human guardians could
fulfil roles such as the voting proxies for non-humans described by Gray
and Curry (2016) in their discussion of ecodemocracy. The same applies
for dispute resolution mechanisms whereby nature must have access to
justice, can sue human agents (including local human communities)
and can be awarded court rulings in its favour, for example through acts
of restoration (if its integrity has been violated) (Stone, 1972).
‘Distribution’ in ecojustice means allocating fairly the benefits and
costs of decisions between nature and humans, and specifically redu-
cing and mitigating the cost of human actions over nature. In social
justice, Franks et al. (2018) have described three criteria: equality,
merit need (see also Sikor et al., 2014). The same principles can be
applied in ecojustice, where nature is awarded its share of benefits
according to its own intrinsic value and rights, the costs it suffers from
human activities, and its need to thrive.
Our ecological justice framework is intended to address the dy-
namics of annihilation of nature – the 6th mass extinction – and re-
cognizes that the current state of the planet is the product of a strong
hierarchisation between human life and nonhuman life, including
ecological collectives. Conservation projects often – willingly or un-
willingly – reproduce past patterns of ecological injustice. This is par-
ticularly true in the anthropocentric “new conservation” paradigm
where conservation is cast as a tool for development (Kareiva et al.,
2011). This discourse is increasingly spreading into conservation
forums. Similarly, conservation is becoming more interdisciplinary and
open to ‘critical social scientists’ that also come from an anthropo-
centric perspective (Kopnina et al., 2018a). In other words, conserva-
tion seems to increasingly be more about social justice than about
conservation itself, and this amounts to committing an ecological in-
justice, reinforcing human supremacy. In that regard, we invite con-
servation practitioners to check their conservation practices against the
three dimensions above, but also against three ecojustice criteria: pri-
vilege, internalized dominance and oppression also used for social
justice (Sensoy and Diangelo, 2009).
Privilege pertains to the power, benefits and advantages that are
systematically allocated to a particular dominant group and its mem-
bers, without questioning this allocation (Sensoy and Diangelo, 2009).
The discourse of that dominant group shapes norms and customs and
carries a universal significance. Applying ecojustice in conservation
requires identifying, questioning and deconstructing privileges that are
systematically granted to humans over nature in conservation practices
and literature.
Internalized dominance refers to the dominant group un-
questionably assuming its superior position over other marginalized
groups. It is often performed through rationalizing privilege as being
‘common sense’, natural, or earned or deserved (Sensoy and Diangelo,
2009). In an ecojustice perspective, we invite conservation practitioners
to systematically challenge biases of human supremacy (Crist, 2012),
and how such biases (even if hidden) shape decision-making.
Oppression pertains to discourses, policies and practices that sys-
tematically dominate, oppress and exploit a marginalized group by a
dominant one (Sensoy and Diangelo, 2009). Such oppression can take
the form of norms, institutions or direct violence. As ecojustice aims to
fight the oppression of nature by humans, it is critical that conservation
projects do not perpetuate it by – inadvertently or deliberately – con-
sidering that nature exists or is valued only to serve human needs or
wishes.
We invite conservation practitioners to systematically screen their
activities against our ecojustice framework and its dimensions and
criteria, and engage in ecojustice mainstreaming - as is done for other
causes (Pollack and Hafner-Burton, 2000; Rees, 2006). We recommend
that organisations that fund conservation projects require that all pro-
jects explain how they will promote ecojustice, and stipulate that eco-
justice training becomes part of overall conservation curricula.
5. Conclusion
Humanity is faced with a serious predicament it does not wish to
acknowledge – the accelerating ecocide and the mass extinction of life
on Earth – due entirely to human actions. Such denial has been aided by
a dominant anthropocentric worldview that denies nonhuman nature
any value, agency or justice. Much of academia has been slow even to
mention the idea of ecojustice, focusing purely on social justice, and
environmental justice (just for humans). Even those who acknowledge
the intrinsic value of nature often fail to acknowledge the need to speak
out for ecojustice (or to mention the concept). Instead, they seem to be
attempting to push justice for nature into the periphery of social justice.
We maintain this is both unethical, and doomed to failure as a strategy
to protect life on Earth. Any meaningful long-term conservation
strategy must overturn the ‘code of silence’ about ecojustice. We thus
urge academia to foreground ecojustice.
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